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Abstract 
The objective of this article is quasi-experimental. By using the logic of game theory to explain the 
establishment of the state of the United Arab Emirates, the article intends to test the ability of a game theory 
to explain a pre-played game. Although formal game theory is not susceptible to experimentation, game to 
political science and public policy is like experiments to psychology. Hence this paper attempts to use the 
already played game of the establishment of the state of the United Arab Emirates as an experiment to answer 
the question: is the outcome of this game conforms with game theory modeling. Thus, the article models that 
game as the Extended Battle of Sexes game and use both the normal and extensive forms to address that 
question. 
Keyword: Game Theory, Political Science, Public Policy, Public Policy 
Introduction 
The paper facilitates the mathematical logic of game theory as applied in political science and public policy to 
address two existential issues related to the establishment of the state of the United Arab Emirates (UAE)  
(Lambertini, 2011; McCain, 2015; Morrow, 1994; Ordeshook, 1992) McCarty & Meirowitz, 2007): first, what are 
the dynamic interactions that had driven the Sheikhs of the previous Trucial Emirates to come together to form 
a unifying entity? and second, how can we explain the outcome of these interaction? Consequently, we use 
game theory to model these interactions as an “Extended Battle of the Sexes” game and try to use this model 
to explain the outcome of that interaction. The game of the formation of the modern state of the UAE has 
already been played yet the article is also interested in it to test the ability of game theory to explain how this  
outcome materialized in practice.  
Thus the objective of this article is to use the mathematical logic of game theory to answer a major question: to 
what extent that the successful formation of the Federation of the United Arab from the previous Arab Trucial 
Emirates is explainable by the logic of game theory? Or in other words: how the scheme of unifying the previous 
Arab Trucial Emirates in the Gulf region has succeeded to form the present federal system of the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE)?  
The answer to these questions helps unveils the basic characteristics of the UAE and the behavior of its 
policymakers as well as the dynamics of politics and policymaking therein. These characteristics and the 
associated dynamics of their politics and policymaking are shaped by certain internal historical and socio-
political factors as well as economic and external factors. The latter refers to the roles of foreign big powers, 
such as Great Britain, the USA and other previous European colonial powers as well as the rising regional powers  
such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, in influencing the choices of policy actors in this process.  
The roles of these powers have varying degrees of influence on decision-making regarding the issues that the 
previous Trucial Emirates were facing before the establishment of their new state in December 1971 and explain 
their drive at the time to seek some sort of unifying arrangements between them. Because of the objective and 
nature of this paper, we prefer to use the term “policymaker” instead of the term “policymaker” which game 
theorists usually prefer.  
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Literature Review 
Game theory has been widely used in political science and public policy to address varied types of interactive 
situations in political activities and public policymaking. A game in game theory is a mathematical tool that help 
in formalizing strategic interactions among different types of actors (i.e. players) in different political, social, and 
international contexts. Political scientists and policy analysts utilize many games such the zero -sum games, 
coordination games, cooperation games to study different policy problems such wars, trade, and voting 
((Lambertini, 2011; McCain, 2015). The literature on the application of game theory to social sciences, especially 
economics, political science, and public policy, as well as natural sciences especially biology, is so vast and 
complex that it will be impossible to review it in a limited space allowed by any academic journal.  
Moreover, since the 1950s and with the passage of time, game theory has developed into a labyrinth of complex 
mathematical symbols, ideograms, mathematical models, and formulae. Thus, the article follows in this literature 
review, professor Ordeshook’s advice in relation to the use of game theory in politica l science research in which 
he states that “(C)ertainly it is impossible to read it all and those who try, produce little” (Ordeshook, 1995, p. 
Preface xiv). Since the article concerns the related disciplines of political science and public policy, this literature 
review covers briefly only some important academic works related to these two disciplines and other social 
sciences that are pertinent to them such as psychology and political philosophy.  
The Origin and Evolution of Game Theory  
Ernst Zemlo (1913) and John von Neuman (1928) pioneered the field of game theory (Giacomo, 2018). However, 
the breakthrough in the field came with John von Neuman and Oscar Morgenstern’s book “Theory of Economic 
Behavior”  (1944, 1947, 2004). In general, two approaches to research in game theory arise from von Neuman 
and Morgenstern’s book: cooperative and noncooperative theories thereby creating a sharp dichotomy between 
two streams of research in political science and other social sciences. However, “Theory of Economic Behavior”,  
though it revives the utility theory which plays a central role in modern game-theoretic models, did not provide 
convincing solutions to both forms of games (R. McCain, 2015).  
This mission is accomplished by the successive contributions of other pioneers of game theory such as John 
Forbes Nash (1950, 1951), Lloyd Shapley (1954), Harsanyi (1967), M. Davis and M. Maschler’s (1965),  Schmeidler,  
Dermot Gately(1974),  Selten (1975), Robert Aumann and (1995) and several others. These authors attempt to 
provide alternative solutions to refine the Nash equilibria (that in many cases present multiple equilibria in the 
same game) as a solution to games by providing new solutions. Samuelson (2016) criticize the multiplicity of 
Nash equilibrium as well as its refinements and take it as proof of the irrelevance of game theory to economics. 
 Despite the importance of cooperative theory, in recent social science research non-cooperative game models 
prevail (R. McCain, 2015) Samuelson (2016) laments this drop of cooperative theory which he considers as more 
relevant to economics and social sciences.The dichotomy between cooperative and noncooperative game 
theories in political science research is criticized by many game theorists because in reality the behavior of 
people in political settings is a mixture of cooperation and non-cooperation (R. McCain, 2015).  
Therefore, many theorists support the development of an integrated theory of games blending together  
cooperative and noncooperative games. There is a substantial volume of research that integrates cooperative 
and noncooperative game theory facilitating the mechanism design theory which conceptualizes the game as 
interactions to achieve certain goals and attempt to find the rules of the game that makes these goals achievable. 
Thus, it assumes the outcome of the game as being a result of cooperative or noncooperative games or both 
(McCarty & Meirowitz, 2007). 
Game Theory in the Social Sciences 
Von Neuman and Morgenstern landmark contribution attracted the attention of mathematicians and 
mathematically sophisticated economist, but Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa’s (1989) book “Games and 
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Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey” opens a window of opportunity for social science to utilize game 
theory in academic research. Thus Aumann, (1985, p. 4) quoted by McCain, (2015, p. 3) states that game theory 
is interdisciplinary and relevant to many sciences including “mathematics, computer sciences, economics, 
biology, (national) political science, international relations, social psychology, management, business, 
accounting, law, philosophy, statistics and even literary criticism (Colman, 2003; R. McCain, 2015). Many authors 
criticize this claim of universal application of game theory (Rubinstein 2013, Samuelson 2016, Guerrien 2018).  
Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa (1989) book also paved the way for experimental and empirical studies in 
psychology and other social sciences (Anatol & Carol, 1962; Guyer & Perkel, 1972; Smith, 1992; Wrightsman, 
O’Conner, & Baker, 1972). Plentiful publications using game theory in economics abound, but its application by 
political scientists, biologists, sociologists, and philosophers are more recent albeit flourishing rapidly (Colman, 
2003; DiCicco-Bloom & Gibson, 2010; R. McCain, 2015; Morrow, 1994; Ordeshook, 1992).  
In general rational choice theory, (i.e. the branch of rational theory that refers more specifically to game theory)  
has influenced political science and public policy studies through the seminal works of Neuman and 
Morgenstern “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior”, Arrow’s’ “Social Choice and Individual Values”, Anthony 
Down’s “Economic Theory of Democracy” and Mancur Olson’s “ The Logic of Collective Action”. The impact of 
Rational Choice and game theories in the field of American political science was highlighted by the contributions  
of William H. Riker and the Rochester school in 1990 (Munnc, 2001) 
Game Theory in Political Science and Public Policy 
At first most political scientists, trained in the legacies of Hobbes, Locke, and Dahl were scared away from game 
theory because of its rigorous mathematical modeling, (Luce & Raiffa, 1989). Political theorists started to utilize 
it in philosophical logic and the emergence of social norms and morals (Ordeshook, 1992), trade negotiations 
and political behavior (Morrow, 1994; Riker, 1962). However, in all social sciences, only social psychology utilizes 
experimental approaches to study rational behavior using few strictly competitive zero-sum-games in which the 
researchers attempted to test the behavior of the participants towards adopting a minimax strategy in 
competitive games. In many cases, the result did not prove the optimality of minimax strategies advocated by 
game theorists to solve these games.  
This assumption also implicates other experimental studies using noncooperative games such as the prisoner’s 
dilemma. This result is explainable by the limitation of the assumption of rationality of policymakers and its 
conceptualization in term of rational self-interest. In the majority of cases, participants in these games deviated 
away from minimax strategies to take advantage of their opponents ignorance (see for example, Atkinson & 
Suppes, 1958; Flood, Lendenmann, & Rapoport, 1983; J. Fox, 1972; John Fox & Guyer, 1973; Kaufman & Lamb, 
1967; Malcolm & Lieberman, 1965; Pate, Broughton, & Letterman, 1974; Payne, 1965; Sakaguchi, 1960). In some 
cases, the use of 2 ×2 matrices made it difficult to interpret the findings of these experiments.  
These experimental studies are criticized in terms of their limited generalizability to actual life situation and the 
assumption of rationality underlying their payoff structures. The concept of the rationality o f policymakers  
receives a substantial amount of criticism especially in political science and economics (Yang, 2007). Few clear-
cut conclusions conforming with the stipulations of formal game theory were arrived at in published 
experimental research in strictly competitive games. (Apfelbaum, 1974; Colman, 2003; Hamburger, 1979). 
Likewise experiments with non-zero- sum games such as the famous game “the prisoners’ dilemma” did not 
come up with conclusive results either (Colman, 2003). Nevertheless, it is evident that game theory is more 
appropriate than conventional non-strategic one-way causal theories for understanding social interactions  
involving interdependent relationships (Colman, 2003; Ordeshook, 1995). 
Shubik (1973) identifies the political science topics for which game theory may be appealing. These include 
“voting, the study of power, diplomacy, negotiations and bargaining behavior, coalition formation among 
political groups and logrolling”. It is very clear that Shubik list was related to the USA political setting. In fact, 
the use of game theory to study politics has gone far beyond this limited Shubik’s list. Game theory has been 
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used by political scientists to study areas of voting, political activism, bureaucratic control, crisis barraging, arms 
control and alliances and negotiations (Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Gates, S and Hume, 2000; Harsanyi, 1967; M. 
Shubik, 1982). Miller, Bartos, & Wehr (2002) uses game theory to study conflict resolution. Shapley & Shubik 
(1954) used the value theory to develop an index of power in political organizations. During the cold war, several 
political scientists use the model of the “prisoner’s dilemma” to the study of the bilateral arms race (Brams, 1975; 
Hamburger, 1979). Lumsden (1973) proves that the strategies of Greek and Turkish Cypriots conceptualized the 
conflict between them in term of the Prisoner’s dilemma. In the Cuban missiles’ crises in 1962 between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, which brought the world to the brink of global war, Martin Shubik (1973) 
and Brams (1975) uses the Chicken game to analyze the confrontation between the two countries.  
The first effort to apply game theory to politics was undertaken by William Riker (1962). Influenced by von 
Neumann and Morganstern (1944,  2004), utilized a cooperative game model to explain the structure of 
coalitions and thereby represents the first attempt to utilize game theory to understand political behavior 
(Austen-Smith, 2006). In international political economy (IPE) many classical games facilitate the study of 
cooperation and conflict in international settings such as symmetrical games like Harmony, Prisoners’ Dilemma, 
Battle of the Sexes, Stag Hunt, and Chicken. In all these games policymakers have no dominant strategy of 
cooperation. This conclusion reflects the 19th-century liberalism which was expressed in the Smithian axiom that 
everyone would be better off with free trade and open markets (Lewis, 2014).  
Other IPE scholars also use asymmetrical games such as “called bluff” and “suasion” (Lewis, 2014) to study the 
interactions of actors with asymmetrical and different leverages. Haywood (1950, 1954) used a two-person zero-
sum game model to study military decision making in the Battle of Bismarck between the United States and 
Japan. Hagemann, Kufenko, & Raskov (2016) utilize game theory to compare the evolution of game theory in 
both the USA and the late Soviet Union and to see how the environment of the cold war affected the 
development of game theory in the latter. They also used game theory to model the position of both sides 
behind the Iron Curtain.  
Following the same lines, Mesquita (2006) utilizes game theory to discuss its use in political economy and the 
study of war and peace. Emphasizing the entanglement of domestic and international politics and attempting 
to develop a ratification theory in international theory, Putnam (1988) provides a theoretical framework using 
the logic of two-level games to study the interaction between domestic politics, international affairs, and 
diplomacy. In the same vein, (Snidal, 1985) discusses the relevance of game theory to international relations 
pointing out its potentials for empirical testing and the limitation of N-person games to capture the complexity 
of international politics. Nevertheless, he doesn’t explain the epistemological question of why game theory is 
relevant to international politics and the relevance or irrelevance of some models to specific international issues. 
Hsueh (2015) uses cooperative game theory to study the influence of internationalized coalitions on political 
leaders and the impact of that influence on issues of trade and international conflict.  
 Although in international relations (IR) game theory has not attained the same position as American politics, 
the theory is widely used in IR. This fact is not equally true to comparative politics until the 1990s when the use 
of game theory became consequential with in-depth studies of issues of democratization, economic reform, 
ethnic mobilization, and nationalism. In comparative politics, Munck, (2001) criticizes the claim of universal 
applicability of game theory and the concepts of expected utility theory and equilibria. He argues that it could 
be used as a complementary theory with other traditional theories in comparative politics and that it can be 
relevant to certain domains without revealing those domains . 
DiCicco- Bloom and Gibson (2010) argue that in sociology, despite the fond of sociologists with game 
metaphors, they rarely go beyond passing reference to generic games. They highlighted the importance of game 
theory in exploring the relationship between rules and constraints on one hand and the emergent social order 
on the other. Sociologists use the games of chess, go and (Texas hold ‘em) poker for sociological insights in 
areas of markets, welfare and politics, and professions. Although the author discusses in detail the analogs and 
strategies of these games, he does not apply any of them to a specific social interaction. Nevertheless, the value 
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of this paper lies in the fact that simple games like the Battle of the Sexes as we exploit in this article can capture 
social and political interactions 
Even though most actual situations in public policy are interactive in nature, few studies utilize the approach of 
game theory. For example, political scientists, utilizing the concept of coalition in cooperative game theory game 
theory, study the behaviour of coalitions regarding the problem of externalities in public policy, and use non-
cooperative and cooperative games to study the problems of monopoly, monopsony, bargaining power, 
majority rule and the free-rider problems (Kosfeld, Okada, & Riedl, 2009; R. McCain, 2015). Highlighting the 
paucity of facilitating game theory in evaluation research, Hermans, Cunningham, & Slinger (2014) review the 
use of game theory in evaluation research and argue for the use of game theory in policy evaluation. They utilize 
a cooperative game model to evaluate the coastal policy implementation in the Netherlands employing the 
concepts of core and Shapley’s value to solve this game. Schonfeld (2015) discusses the feasibility of game 
theory as an approach to policymaking. Arce & Sandler (2003) examines how game theory may help in the 
analysis of anti-terrorism policies and provides insights that do not depend on non-strategic traditional analysis.  
Political philosophers and theorist apply game theory to questions of morality. For example, Russell (1988) 
applies it to the applications and criticisms of utilitarianism. Some game theorists argue that Kant philosophy 
may benefit from game theory and its analysis of outcomes if everyone follows the rules (Elster, 1989; Roemer, 
2014; Schelling, 1978). Parfit (1981) argues that the “prisoner’s dilemma” can be useful in modeling issues of 
moral cooperation. Lewis (2008) and Schelling (1978) apply coordination games to the problems of social 
interaction in general. Some political scientists and philosophers argue that coordination games such as the 
prisoner’s dilemma, the battle of the sexes, stag hunt and chicken are useable in moral philosophy (Hampton, 
1987; Hausman, McPherson, & Satz, 2018; Michael C., 1987; Russell, 1982). 
Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion to this literature review, there are several points to be highlighted regarding the appropriateness 
of game theory as a tool to political science and public policy studies. It is pertinent here to emphasize both the 
pros and cons of the theory regarding its use in political science and public policy studies. Firstly, game theory 
ability to capture the interdependent interactions of politicians and policymakers in the process of policymaking 
clearly beats the non-strategic conventional models such as elite, group, institutional, and system models, as 
well as modern models of advocacy coalition and several others. These conventional models are non-dynamic 
one-sided approach to addressing these interdependent interactions between politicians and policymakers.  
Rigorous mathematical modeling of political policymaking situations helps give a good perception of the 
problem at hand. Secondly, the application of game theory to political science and public policy s tudies provides 
a practical approach to policy analysis and design because it helps policy analysts configure and simulate real 
policymaking situations and may provide a tool to predict the outcomes of different situation if the 
decisionmakers choose their strategies and policies rationally. One of the weaknesses of game theory is that it 
cannot stand alone in studying different political situations and policymaking processes as its subscribers usually 
claim. It always needs the logic of other political models to explain the outcomes of games. Thus, it is 
complementary to these models rather than a substitute. 
The Methodology of Research: The Game Analytic Framework   
In applying game theory to political science or public policy, the first is step is to represent the policymaking 
situation as a question of interactive decision, i.e. a game between two or more players. Thus, the article uses 
the extended strategic and extensive forms of the symmetrical game of the “Battle of the Sexes”, (i.e. Where to 
Meet) to answer the research question: to what extent that the successful formation of the Federation of the 
United Arab from the previous Arab Trucial Emirates is explainable by the logic of game theory? The game 
highlights the importance of coordination between policymakers to achieve the best possible outcomes. 
The relevance of the model of the “Battle of the Sexes” to the research problem of this article is explainable by 
the fact that the actors have a shared goal but different preferred strategies to arrive a t that goal. Thus, the 
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unified goal of the previous Trucial Emirates to forge some sort of unity between them to establish an 
independent state and their different strategies associated with that goal justifies the use of the game of the 
Extended Battle of the Sexes as a framework for analysis in this article. Two common assumptions underlying 
the methodology of game theory are methodological individualism and purposeful rational action. 
Methodological individualism argues that the outcomes of social processes depend on individual preferences  
and choices (Ordeshook, 1986; Cullis and Jones, 1998). In the context of public policymaking, individuals refer 
to policymakers, policy or actors. Purposeful actions indicate that individuals are mostly guided by their self-
interest and strive to maximize their utilities to achieve their goals. Therefore, policymakers must at least choose 
Pareto optimal or/and Nash Equilibrium outcomes because the potential solutions for the game impose 
different cost and benefits on policymakers. (Ravenhill, 2014).  
The game theory requires the existence of three properties in the interactions between actors to qualify as a 
game (Colman, 2003). First, there must be at least two or more policymakers. In this article, we group the 
policymakers into two groups: Abu Dhabi Emirate (policymaker 1) and the other six Emirates as one actor 
(policymaker 2). Second, each policymaker has at least two strategies (actions) to choose from and the outcome 
of playing these strategies depends on the strategic choices of other policymakers. This paper satisfies this 
property because there are three strategies for each policymaker. Third, the policymakers should have complete 
and transitive preferences, reflected in well-defined payoffs attached to each possible outcome in such a way 
that these numerical payoffs can be assigned to all policymakers for all outcomes. The policymakers in our game 
have complete and transitive preferences over the outcomes available for them. Since the process of the 
formation of the UAE satisfies these three requirements, then it is technically acceptable as a game in the context 
of game theory and can be modeled as a game reflected in an abstract mathematical form. The ordinal game 
in the strategic form with ordinal payoffs (utilities) includes the following quintuple items (I, (S1 … Sn), O, f, ≿1….≿n) 
(Giacomo 2018, 22). 
- I= (2), is the set of policymakers (n = 2) (i.e. Abu Dhabi, the Emirates) 
- (S1, S2) is a list of sets of strategies, one for both policymakers (the subscript 1 and 2 stands for Abu    
Dhabi and the Emirates respectively). We denote by S the Cartesian product of these sets: S= S1×S2; 
thus, an element of S is a list s= (s1, s2, …. Sn) consisting of one strategy profile for both policymakers. 
We call S the set of strategy profiles 
- O is a set of outcomes 
- ƒ: S→ O is a function that associates with every strategy profile s an outcome of ƒ(s) ϵ O”.  
- For both policymakers ≿iis a complete and transitive ranking of the set of outcomes. 
It should be noted from the outset that as the policymakers in this game are playing a mixed-motive game, the 
game is expected to have multiple Nash equilibria because the game assigns different payoffs for each 
policymakers’ strategies. Therefore, we may find multiple Nash equilibria which are non-equivalent and non-
interchangeable. To arrive at one Nash equilibrium solution, the article uses the extensive form of the game 
utilizing the method of backward induction and subgame perfect algorithms to pick up the one plausibly rational 
Nash equilibrium from the available multiple pure and mixed strategies in the strategic form. Whereas the article 
assumes that the actors play the strategic form of the game simultaneously with complete information, it 
assumes that the actors move sequentially in the extensive form with complete yet imperfect information.  
The game frame of the extensive form with complete, imperfect information includes the following items: 
- “A finite rooted directed tree  
- A set of policymakers I = (2) and a function that assigns one policymaker to every decision node.  
- A set of actions and a function that assigns one action to every directed edge, satisfying the restriction that 
no edges out of the same node are assigned the same action. 
- A set of outcomes O and a function that assigns an outcome to every terminal node 
- The ranking ≿i.of the set of outcomes O for every policymaker i ∈ (2)”  represented by the ordinal function 
Ui: U: O→ℝ: and a payoff function π(s) = Uiƒ(s)(Giacomo 2018, 76) 
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-  The Emirates has a partition PE of the set XE of decision nodes assigned to it. Hence  Pi is mutually disjoint 
subsets of XE whose union is equal to XE. Each element of PE represents an information set of the Emirates 
indicating its lack of knowledge about the movement of Abu Dhabi in its nodes.  
- Each policymaker has a perfect recall in this game. 
The article depends on data collected from secondary resources including books, published articles, and 
government reports. Finally, the article utilizes Eric Rasmussen’s (2006) four elements to define and organize the 
different parts of the article. These include the policymakers (policymakers) in the game, 
the information and actions (strategies) available to each policymaker at each decision point, and the payoffs for 
each outcome. He refers to these elements collectively by the pseudonym PAPI. Moreover, in this paper, we use 
utility theory, founded by John von Neuman and Oscar Morgenstern (1944), to represent mathematically the 
decisions of policymakers and to calculate the probabilities and expected values of Mixed Strategy Nash 
Equilibria (MSNE) in the game.  
Discussion: The Context of the Game 
The area now occupied by the modern state of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was inhabited by a vast number  
of Arab tribes organized along patron-client networks of relationships that put the Sheikh (patron) of the tribe 
as a leader of the tribe with his tribesmen as followers (clients) (Mansour 2008). This network of patron-client 
relationship is reciprocal where the patron provides certain services for his followers in return for their loyalty, 
legitimacy, and support.  
Thus, this patron-client relationship characterized the ruler-ruled relationships in the previous autonomous tribal 
entities of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras Al-Khaimah, Ajman, Um Al-Quwain, Fujairah, Qatar, and Bahrain. 
Before the establishment of the UAE, the area had been a rife stage for competing international powers, like 
Iran, Portugal, Holland, and Britain, and later the United States seeking to dominate the area for its strategic 
geographic position on the coast of the Arabian Gulf which was and still a very important route for international 
trade.  
In 1820 Great Britain invaded the area and made it one of its protectorates to protect its marine trade route to 
India which had been previously suffering from the attacks of the then-dominant Qassimi tribesmen centered 
in Ras Al Khaimah. Between 1820 and 1853, Britain reached two peace agreements with the tribal Sheikhs  
regarding their relationship with Britain and the safety of its trade route in the. Meanwhile, the British managed 
the area indirectly through agreements with local Sheiks and labeling these Sheikhdoms the Trucial Emirates  
(Mansour 2018).  
After the Second World War, Great Britain declared on April 9, 1968, its intentions to leave the area by the year 
1971. To preserve its interests, especially that the oil had already been discovered in Abu Dhabi by British oil 
companies, and the first oil shipment left Abu Dhabi port in 1962, advised the tribal Sheikhs to form a new state. 
Therefore, Abu Dhabi became the richest among the other Emirates. Consequently, Britain strived to establish 
an independent state out of these Trucial Emirates to counter  the Iranian claims of territorial ownership of the 
area.  
This Iranian threat was the prime factor behind the shared goal of the Trucial Emirates to establish a new state 
that may bring them together in some sort of a unifying arrangement. Hence negotiations for establishing the 
new state started in 1968 before the British departure in 1971. Already in 1952, the rulers of the seven Emirates - 
Abu Dhabi, Dubai, AL-Sharjah, Ras Al Khama, Ajman, Um Al-Quain, Al Fujairah- established the Council of the 
Trucial Emirates formed of the rulers of these seven Emirates.  
Dubai was chosen as the center of the council- a fact reflecting the strong position of Dubai which was then the 
richest. Following the British declared intention of departure, the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai agreed to unite 
their two Emirates and invited the other Emirates including Bahrain and Qatar to join them. On 27 February 
1968, the rulers of the Emirates of Sharjah Ajman, Um Al Quain, Fujairah accepted the invitation. In 18 of July 
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1971 the agreement of establishing the federation from the six Emirates was reached and on December 2, 1971, 
the six Emirates declared the birth of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as an independent state.  
At first, Ras Al Khaimah refused to join the new federation until February 1972 when it accepted to join to 
become the seventh Emirate in the new federation. Both Qatar and Bahrain opted out in the final stage and 
declared themselves as independent States. Both feared the hegemony of the rich Abu Dhabi over them whic h 
was the same reason behind the reluctance of Ras Al Khaimah to join the new union.  The revenue from Abu 
Dhabi oil exports turned Abu Dhabi into the most powerful and richest among the other Emirates. Its oil 
production accounts to 85% of the UAE oil exports with oil reserves placing it at the sixth international rank. This 
fact made the idea of some form of unity with Abu Dhabi more attractive to the small and relatively poor 
Emirates of Ajman, Um Al Quain, and Fujairah.  
However, it should be noted that all the Emirates put a high value on their historical autonomy which 
represented the networks of patron-client relationships that underly the legitimacy of these rulers. This 
relationship is formalized in the Sheikh Majlis (council). An official government publication (UAE Yearbook, 2006) 
describes the working of these Majlises in the following words: The ruler of an emirate, the Sheikhs, was the 
leader of the most powerful, though not necessarily the most populous, tribe, while each individual tribe, and 
often its subsections, also generally had a chief or Sheikhs. Such rulers and chiefs maintained their authority 
only insofar as they were able to retain the loyalty and support of their people, in essence, a form of direct 
democracy, though without the paraphernalia of western forms of suffrage. Part of that democracy was the 
unwritten but strong principle that the people should have free access to their Sheikhs, and that he should hold 
a frequent and open Majlis, or council, in which his fellow tribesmen could voice their opinions. Nevertheless, a 
fascinating aspect of life in the UAE today, and one that is essential to an understanding of its political system 
is the way in which the institution of the Majlis maintains its relevance.  
In larger Emirates, not only the ruler, but also a number of other senior family members, continue to hold open 
Majlises (or Majlis), in which participants may raise a wide range of topics request for a piece of land, or 
scholarship for a son or daughter to go abroad, to more weighty (sic) subjects such as the impact of large-scale 
immigration upon societies or about perceived flaws in the practices of various ministries.  The strong desire to 
preserve their local autonomy and the sanctity of the patron-client network prevented the emergence of a 
strong unitary state like in other Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (GCC) states and reflected the fear of the 
other six Emirates from the possibility of the oil-rich Abu Dhabi perceived hegemony over the newly proposed 
state. This is a good example of the framing effect in game theory where the interdependent policymakers 
interpret the decision problems in particular ways which lead to the different conceptualization of the policy 
problem and consequently to different decisions.   
Nevertheless, the northern poor Emirates wanted to benefit from the riches of Abu Dhabi. It should be noted 
that Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi Emirate, was a crucial policymaker in the formation of the 
modern federal state of the United Arab Emirates because of his charismatic personality and the richness of his 
Emirate from oil revenues. He always supported unity not only among the Gulf Emirates but in the Arab World 
at large. Therefore, he supported the establishment of a federal entity with a  powerful central government. 
Fearful for their historical autonomy, the other Emirates wanted a powerful and autonomous Emirate 
government and a weak federal government in a loose federation. Thus, both Abu Dhabi and the other Emirates 
derive no pleasure from being separate (i.e. their shared goal) yet they adopt different strategies to achieve that 
goal. This situation coincides with the structure of the “Extended Battle of the Sexes” game and therefore it is 
the justification for the use of this game to model the game of the establishment of the United Arab Emirates.  
The Policymakers (The Policymakers) 
Most public policy and political game theory postulates are based on the idea that policymakers pursue 
rationally the achievement of their goals within an environment constrained by available resources and the 
expected behavior of other policymakers. Rationality in this context requires the existence of the properties of 
completeness and transitivity of policymakers’ preferences. The policymakers in this game include the rulers of 
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the Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Al-Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Ajman, Um Al Quain, Al Fujairah, Qatar, and 
Bahrain. The actions or strategies and expected payoffs or outcomes available for theses nine policymakers are 
dictated by their economic conditions, internal social structure, and power configurations which was discussed 
in the previous section.  
The Game and Information  
Basically, the establishment of the UAE may be considered as an n-person game if we treat each Emirates as a 
single policymaker. But the choice to treat them as a two-person game by considering the Emirates other than 
Abu Dhabi as one policymaker because they adopt the same strategies and have the same goal which is different 
from Abu Dhabi’s. As Luce and Raiffa (1989) note, that when the number of policymakers exceeds two, there is 
a possibility that they collude with each and coordinate their strategies to increase their expected utility by more 
than they can get it if they act individually. This is especially true for the three small Emirates: Ajman, Um Al 
Quain, Al Fujairah. The latter are poor in economic resources and small in Area. Table 1 below depicts the 
population and the area of each of the Emirates.  
Table 1 
The Current Population Area of the UAE Constituent Emirates 
Emirate Capital 
Population Area 
2005 % (km²) (mi²) % 
Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi 2,784,490 29.0% 67,340 26,000 86.7% 
Ajman Ajman 372,922 3.9% 259 100 0.3% 
Dubai Dubai 4,177,059 42.8% 3,885 1,500 5.0% 
Fujairah Fujairah 152,000 1.6% 1,165 450 1.5% 
Ras Al Khama Ras Al Khama 416,600 4.3% 2,486 950 3.2% 
Sharjah Sharjah 2,374,132 24.7% 2,590 1,000 3.3% 
Umm al-Quwain Umm al-Quwain 72,000 0.8% 777 300 1% 
UAE Abu Dhabi 9,599,353 100% 77,700 30,000 
100% 
 
 
 
Source:  "Census 2005". Ministry of Economy and Planning, Government of the United Arab Emirates. 2018. 
Archived from the original on 2009-11-06. Retrieved 2009-11-13. 
It should be noted that the figures in the table reflect the population of each Emirate after the establishment of 
the federation. Therefore, the figures show the size of the nationals and the expatriates who are attrac ted to the 
area by the tremendous amounts of oil revenues and the massive economic development projects in the light 
of the shortage of skilled local manpower to fill the ranks of the government bureaucracy and manage and carry 
out economic projects (Mansour, 2018). On the eve of the emergence of the new state, the number of Emeriti 
nationals is estimated to be around 20000 (Mansour, 2018). Table 1 also shows that whereas Abu Dhabi occupies 
86.7% of the total area of the UAE, the other Emirates occupy only 11.3%. The three small Emirates Ajman, 
Fujairah and Umm al-Quwain occupy respectively areas of 0.3%, 1.5%, and 1%. Whereas Dubai, Ras Al Khama, 
and Sharjah occupy respectively 5%, 3.2% and 3.3% of the total area of the UAE. Coupled with its vast wealth, 
Abu Dhabi dominates the area. Had it not been for the strong beliefs of Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan (Abu Dhabi 
Ruler) in unity, Abu Dhabi could have established itself as an independent state with an area and wealth greater 
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than the independent states of Qatar and the Kingdom of Bahrain who opted out of the negotiations at the last 
stage of the negotiations. The figures in the table corporate this conclusion. Nevertheless, the figures of the 
table also demonstrate the fear of the Emirates for their local autonomy. It is evident from this discussion that 
the different actors were interacting in a political situation with each actor trying to maximize his interest by 
adopting certain strategies. Moreover, the discussion shows different policy makers had possessed different 
levels of political power and hence different political leverages. This situation justifies the use of game theory. 
Strategies and Ordinal Payoffs 
We have two types of strategies: pure and mixed strategies. The policymakers in this game have three pure 
strategies reflecting the dynamics of the Extended Battle of the Sexes game. The same pure strategies are 
available for both sets of policymakers. These include (1) a strong federation with a strong federal government 
with weak local Emirates autonomy. We denote this strategy with the symbol (U), (2) a loose weak federal 
government preserving the autonomy of the Emirates. We refer to this strategy by the symbol (F), and the (3) 
preserving the status quo which would mean the failure to establish the new state. We denote this strategy by 
the symbol (S). For each of these strategies, the policymakers have outcomes associated with ordinal payoff 
functions. Mathematically these payoff functions associate each strategy in the game with a unique ordinal 
payoff that indicates the valuation of each policymaker of the costs and benefits of each strategy to his Emirate. 
A complete payoff function for all the policymakers is a combination of the individual policymakers’ functions  
which “specifies the payoffs to all policymakers for every conceivable outcome of the game” (Colman, 2003, 7). 
The payoffs accruing form each strategy in this game reflect the dynamics of the Extended Battle of the Sexes 
game. Thus, the sets of Abu Dhabi and the Emirates strategies are identical as shown below. 
Abu Dhabi (S1) = {UA) = ⸫(s1), (FA) = (s2), (SA) = (s3)}  
Emirates (S2) = {(UE) = (s4), FE = (s5), SE, (s6)} 
⸫ S =S1= (s1, s2, s3) = S = (s4, s5, s6) 
We denote the Cartesian product by the symbol S which produces a bijection set representing the strategy 
profiles of the two policymakers in this game. 
S1×S2 = (s1, s4), (s1, s5) (s1, s6), (s2, s4), (s2, s5), (s2, s6), (s3, s4), (s3, s5), (s3, s6) 
O is the list of outcomes. Therefore, the function ƒ: S→ O, such that oi ∈ O is  
s: =   (s1, s4), (s1, s5) (s1, s6), (s2, s4), (s2, s5), (s2, s6), (s3, s4), (s3, s5), (s3, s6) 
ƒ(s):             o1             o2            o3          o4             o5             o6               o7           o8            o9 
To develop a game from the game frame discussed in the methodology we must add the ranking or preferences 
of each policymaker over his/her possible outcomes Both Abu Dhabi and Emirates had different ranking ≿  over 
these outcomes. These rankings may be expressed in the following symbols (the subscripts A and E refer to Abu 
Dhabi and the Emirates respectively). Thus, for Abu Dhabi the ranking ≿A is…  
o1 ≿A o2 ≻ o3  ∼A o4 ∼A o5 ∼A o6 ∼A o7 ∼A o8~A o9 
and the ranking ≿Efor the Emirates is… 
o3  ∼E  o2 ≿Eo1 ∼E o4 ∼E  o5 ∼E  o6 ∼E o7 ∼E o8 ∼E  o9 
However, if these preferences over outcomes are based on the implicit and unwarranted assumption that Abu 
Dhabi wanted to hegemonize the other Emirates, then the ranking of its outcome would be o1A ≻ o2 ≻ o3. The 
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Emirates ranking reflects their keen intention to preserve their local autonomy. In fact, Abu Dhabi was benevolent 
to its partners and wanted keenly to establish some unifying entity with the other Emirates. Thus, the above 
ranking of outcomes reflects the fact that the policymakers were willing to come together to form a political 
configuration that brings them together, yet they have different ideas about the nature and structure of this  
proposed scheme. Whereas the stronger and richer Abu Dhabi preferred the formation of a federal system with 
a strong federal government, the other seven Emirates, fearful of the rich Abu Dhabi’s hegemony on the 
proposed state and the consequent loss of their local autonomy, were sticking together to preserve their long -
time autonomous rule and prefer a loose federal government. Therefore, they were seeking a solution that 
preserves their autonomy though they want some form of association with Abu Dhabi. Thus, they are all keen 
to establish a new state because of the Iranian threat and other countries. Since, πi(s) = Ui(ƒ (s) (where πi  stands 
for payoffs of player i and Ui stands for utilities of policymaker i) thus, we have the following ordinal utility 
function with a complete and transitive finite set of O: U: O→ℝ (where ℝ denotes a set of real numbers). For Abu 
Dhabi and the Emirates U: O→ℝ consists of the following: (UA and UE denote the utilities  of both Abu Dhabi and 
the Emirates) 
s: =   (s1, s4), (s1, s5) (s1, s6), (s2, s4), (s2, s5), (s2, s6), (s3, s4), (s3, s5), (s3, s6) 
ƒ(s):        o1             o2            o3          o4             o5             o6               o7           o8            o9 
UA          3           0         0         0          2          0            0        0          0  
UE                2           0        3          0          0          0            0        0          0     
If we substitute the rankings ≾i of both Abu Dhabi and the Emirates for an ordinal utility function U i that 
represent them and we assign to the strategy profiles s of both policymakers their ordinal utilities associated 
with the  f (s), then we get a function πi : S → ℝ representing the payoffs function of both policymakers. Hence 
π(s) = Uiƒ(s). Therefore. we get a triple game frame in of a reduced-form of an ordinal game in a normal form 
(I, (S1, …. Sn), (π1….πn) which allows us to produce a reduced game in strategic form using only the policymaker’s  
strategies without specifying their associated outcomes. Table 2 depicts the reduced game of the “Extended 
Battle of the Sexes” in pure strategies. 
Table 2 
The Reduced-Game in Strategic Form of the Extended Battle of the Sexes  
 
Emirates 
 
 
Abu Dhabi 
 
S4 (UE) 
 
                                                       
 
S5 (FE) 
 
                   
 
S6 (SE) 
 
                    
s1 (UA) 3*,2* 0, 0               *0,3* 
s2 (FA) 0,0 2*,3* 0,0 
s3 (SA) 0,0 0,0 0,0 
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The first three columns represent the original 2 × 2 Battle of the Sexes game and the fourth together with the 
other three columns represent the extended one. It is clear from the matrix that  Abu Dhabi has two weakly 
dominant strategies s1 (UA) and s2 (FA) because they give it a payoff greater than the payoff of s3 against every 
strategy of the Emirates. Thus πA (s1, s2, s_ A) ≥ πA (s3, s_ A) for every s_ A ϵ S_ A (i.e. s_ A ϵ S_ A refer to the strategies 
of the Emirates). The Emirates also has two weakly dominant strategies s 5 ((FE) and s6 (SE) against every strategy 
of Abu Dhabi. Thus, πE (s5, s6, s_ E) ≥ πE (s4, s_ E) for every sE ϵ S_E (i.e. sE, ϵ SE refer to the strategies of Abu Dhabi) 
because s5, s6 give it payoffs greater than or equal to any of its other strategies in conjunction with the strategy 
profiles of the Abu Dhabi. Thus, the strategy profiles (s1, s4) and (s2, s5) and (s1, s6) are weakly dominant strategy 
equilibria and neither of the two policymakers has a strictly dominant strategy.  
Marking the best responses with asterisks, as shown in the matrix,  it is clear, as expected, that there are three 
asymmetric pure strategies Nash equilibria (PSNEs) in this game and all of them are unstable because the 
policymakers have identical preferences on their outcomes. These are (s 1, s4) (UA, UE), (s2, s5) (FA, FE), and (s1, s6) 
(UA, SE). This is so because πA (s1, s4) ≥  πA (s2, s5) for all si ϵ S1, and πE (s5, s2) ≥ πE (s4, s1) for all si ϵ S2 and πE (s1, s6) ≥ 
πE (s3, s6) for all si ϵ SE. Using the Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IESDS), we can delete Abu 
Dhabi’s strictly dominated strategy s3 by s1 and s2 and we, therefore, end up with the IESDS output (s1, s4), (s2,s5) 
indicating the existence of common knowledge of rationality between the two policymakers.  
Thus, the two PSNEs (s1, s4) and (s2, s5) which survive IESDS are clearly weakly Pareto superior to the other 
strategy profiles of the two policymakers. The third PSNE (s1, s6) is not Pareto optimal because it meant the 
destruction of the desired goal of unity. However, although both s trategy profiles (s1, s4) and (s2, s5) are Pareto 
superior, weakly dominant strategy equilibrium outcomes, and PSNEs, the policymakers would disagree on 
which one to choose and this fact made the two PSNEs unstable. Individual deviation from these three PSNEs in 
this game is overkill because if both actors choose either of the three PSNEs (s1, s4) and (s2, s5) and (s1, s6) neither 
would have a profitable deviation as they would both get a zero for this deviation. Hence both policymakers  
obtain their worst results if both choose any of their non-PSNE.  
A unilateral defector in this game is rewarded less than his partner and therefore described as a “hero.” Rapoprt, 
(1976) argues that joint defection leads to the worst possible outcome for both policymakers as  there is no room 
for two heroes and this what makes this game strategically problematic. If either Abu Dhabi or the Emirates 
deviate unilaterally in the game from their PSNEs, however, they benefit less from such deviation than the other 
policymaker and therefore may be considered a hero. If Abu Dhabi chose s1 it would earn 3 leaving the Emirates 
with a 2, then the Emirates would deviate to s5 and they earn 3 leaving Abu Dhabi with a 2. Both actors can 
benefit by communicating and coordinating their actions in order to indicate a commitment to choose either  
(s1, s4) or (s2, s5) (i.e. UA, UE or FA, FE) but the underlying assumption in non-cooperative games is that such an 
agreement is not possible. However, it is not possible to know from the matrix which of the two PSNEs could 
have been chosen.  
Moreover, both policymakers might choose to use their Mixed Strategies Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) by 
randomizing over their multiple PSNEs in certain probability distribution to conceal their specific choices rather 
than using their pure strategies. In the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) the policy 
s3 is strictly dominated by s1 and s2. Hence in the reduced game only two PSNEs survive. These are s 1, s4 (UA, UE), 
s2, s5 (FA, FE). Thus, Abu Dhabi may mix between its two preferred pure strategies (s1, s2) to induce the Emirates 
to be indifferent between its two pure strategies and the Emirates can mix between their two pure strategies (s 4, 
s5) to leave Abu Dhabi indifferent between its two pure strategies. Since the strategy profile (s1, s6) is a pure Nash 
equilibrium in the 3 × 3 extended games, the Emirates could not mix s6 with its s5 strategy because Abu Dhabi 
would not use it anyway. It is clear that  if Abu Dhabi chooses to mix its most preferred strategy s1 or its second-
best s2 with its least preferred strategy s3, then some percentage of the time it would end up with outcomes 
which are strictly worse than if it chose to mix its preferred strategy s1 with its second choice s2 or paly either of 
its two pure strategies. However, s3 is never an option for Abu Dhabi because it means the failure of the scheme 
of establishing the desired unity among the concerned Trucial Emirates. Thus, Abu Dhabi may mix its two pure 
strategies s1, s2 in the original 2×2 game to make the Emirates indifferent between their two pure strategies s 4, 
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s5. Let p be the probability of Abu Dhabi for choosing s1 and 1-p for using s2. The Emirates could do the same 
with its two strategies s4 and s5. it may choose s4 with probability q and s5 with probability 1-q. Now we want to 
find the values of p, q ∈ (0,1) such that …  
[(
s1 s2
P 1 − p
) ,(
s4 s5
q 1 − q
)] 
is Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium. We assume S i is a finite set for every I ϵ I. Hence, we are looking for a mixed 
strategy from Abu Dhabi that leaves the Emirates indifferent between their  two pure strategies. First, we want 
to find the values of p and 1-p such that: 
 p (s1) (2) + (1-p s1) (0) = p (s1) (0) + (1- p s1) (3) 
2 p s1 = 3 – 3 p s1 
5p s1 = 3 
p s1 = 3/5 
Then Abu Dhabi mixes its pure strategies s1, s2 in MSNE  
(
s1 s2 s3
3
5
3
5
0
) 
Abu Dhabi would never mix its strictly dominated policy of s3 therefore, we assigned the probability of zero to 
it. If Abu Dhabi chooses s1 (i.e. UA) 
3
5
 of the time and s2 (i.e. FA)  
2
5
 of the time, then the Emirates earns the same 
payoff for choosing either of its pure strategies s4 and s5 against Abu Dhabi’s MSNE and any mixture between 
its two strategies is best responses to Abu Dhabi’s MSNEs. Similarly, the Emirates may play the mixture of its 
two pure strategies s4 and s5, in the original game, to make Abu Dhabi indifferent between its pure strategies s 1, 
s2., thereby mixing s4 with q and s5 with 1-q such that: 
 (s4) (3) + (1-q s4) (0) = (q s4) (0) + (1- q) (s4) (2) 
3 q s4 = 2 – 2 q s4 
5 q s4 = 2 
q s4 = 2/5 
If the Emirates mix its pure strategies s4, s5 in MSNEs such that … 
(
s4 s5
2
5
3
5
) 
then Abu Dhabi would receive the same payoff if it chooses any of its two pure strategies s 1 and s2 against the 
Emirates’ MSNEs and Abu Dhabi MSNEs are best response to the Emira tes MSNEs. If we denote Abu Dhabi and 
the Emirates’ MSNEs by σA, σE, respectively then …  
  [σA  =  (
s1 s2
3
5
2
5
)    ,   σE = (
s4 s5
2
5
3
5
)] 
is the MSNE of this game. Hence  
∏A (s1, σE) = ∏A (s2, σE) = πA, and ∏E (s4, σA) = ∏E (s5, σA) = πE. 
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In other words when either Abu Dhabi or the Emirates use their MSNEs they get the same payoff whether they 
use their pure strategies s1 and s2 or s4 and s5 or their mixed strategies σA or σE. However, these probabilities tell 
us nothing about the efficiencies of the MSNEs and therefore it is imperative to calculate their expected utilities  
(EU). If we denote the MSNEs by Σ then … 
∏A = Σ→ℝ = ΣsϵS1 p(s) π (s) 
∏A = (3/5) (2/5) (3) + (3/5) (3/5) (0) + (2/5) (2/5) (0) + (3/5) (2/5) 2 =1 
1
5
 
∏E = Σ→ℝ = Σs ϵS1 p(s) π (s) 
∏E = (2/5) (3/5) (2) + (3/5) (3/5) (0) + (2/5) (2/5) (0) + (3/5) (2/5) 3 = 1 
1
5
 
Both policymakers could not obtain larger payoffs from any mixed strategy where p ≠ 3/5 and q ≠ 2/5. They get 
the same payoff no matter what mixed strategy they use, and their mixed strategies are best responses for each 
other. Since instead of choosing the sets of their mixed strategies both policymakers can play their degenerate 
pure strategies with p =1, hence every PSNE is also MSNE; i.e. the set MSNEs include the set of PSNEs. The 
expected utility of both Abu Dhabi and the Emirates in the MSNE represents weighted averages of each outcome 
that occurs in equilibrium. As such their expected utility in the MSNE of 1 
1
5
 is strictly worse than either of their  
expected utility of their other PSNEs. Thus, Abu Dhabi gets 3 from PSNEs (s1, s4) and 2 from PSNEs (s2, s5) and 
the same is true for the Emirates which earns 3 from PSNEs (s2, s5) and 2 from PSNE (s1, s4). Hence, they have no 
incentive to play their MSNEs.  
The reason for this odd MSNE result is the fact that the PSNEs (s1, s5) and (s5, s1) are identical and represent the 
failure of both policymakers to coordinate their decision-making. Both mixed strategies occur with positive 
probability in the MSNE, accounting for 12/25 of the outcomes. This means both Abu Dhabi and the Emirates 
choose their preferred destination of being together less than half of the time if they adopt their mixed 
strategies, thereby, dragging their payoffs down. Although their MSNEs are rational they represent a strange set 
of strategies.  
It would be better for both policymakers if they coordinate to adopt their pure strategies since the payoffs of 3 
and 2 in their pure strategies beats the 1 
1
5
, they both earn in playing the MSNE. Although the MSNEs are rational 
strategies yet they provide an odd set of strategies.  Hence, if the policymakers choose to play the MSNE, it is 
more rational for them to coordinate their decision-making to adopt one of the strategy profiles of their pure 
strategies. Unfortunately, this coordination is inadmissible in non-cooperative games. This paradox is solvable 
by using the extensive form of the game. 
The extensive form helps to reveal the true dynamic of this game and sometimes provide a one PSNE for it. It is 
justifiable to use the extensive form here because in fact this game was not played once and simultaneously as 
the normal form implies. The negotiations between the actors involved continued for more than three years 
spearheaded by Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi. According to Colman (2003, 103) “The normal 
form conceals important information about the dynamics of the game, and, in reality one of Nash equilibria can 
be discounted: it represents irrational behavior and irrational expectations by the policymakers about each other 
behavior”.  
Moreover, the dynamics of the game are lost when we condense the extensive form of the game into its normal 
form. In the extensive form, some Nash equilibria can be spurious in the sense that they would never be chosen 
by rational policymakers”. This can only be proved by using the extensive form concepts of backward induction 
and subgame perfect equilibrium, which were introduced by Reinhard Selten (1965, 1975). The concept of 
backward induction and subgame perfect equilibrium eliminate spurious Nash equilibria by neutralizing the 
impact of non-credible threats and promises. In the perfect information games , backward induction and 
subgame perfect usually coincide (Giacomo, 2018). 
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It is clear from Table 2 above that both the PSNEs as well as the MSNE do not tell us which strategy profile was 
chosen by the policymakers of both Abu Dhabi and the Emirates and what factors that operate to lead to that 
conclusion. Formal strategic game theory provides no solution to this puzzle when multiple Nash equilibria  exist. 
Thus, the turning of the normal form to an extensive form of our Extended game Battle of the Sexes model may 
explain this predicament. Figure 1 below depicts the extensive form in a directed rooted tree diagram with 
imperfect information. The tree consists of three outdegrees flowing out from the root and nine outdegrees 
flowing out from the Emirates node into the nine decision nodes of the three minimal subgames at the bottom. 
The nodes of the decision tree diagram correspond to the decision points  and are labeled with the name of the 
policymakers whose choices they represent. The edges of the tree include the actions or strategies (policies) 
which the policymakers must choose between them.  
The root node is labeled “Abu Dhabi” indicating the fact that it made the first move to initiate the scheme of 
bringing the Emirates in a unifying arrangement. In fact, the idea of configuring a unifying entity was the initiative 
of the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan. The decision nodes at the second level are labeled “Emirates” 
and it indicates their collective response to Abu Dhabi initiative. In this extensive game, each player has a strategy 
which is defined as a complete and contingent plan of action consisting of the choices of actions available for 
each policymaker in response to any possible action undertaken by one or more sets of policymakers in 
interaction with other policymakers. 
The terminal nodes of the decision tree show the payoffs of each strategy profile that is reached after each 
policymaker has chosen his preferred path in accordance with the rules of the game. We reasonably assume 
when the turn for the Emirates policymaker to make a choice, it does not know the preceding choices of Abu 
Dhabi though it had perfect recalls of its moves. Thus, the game is an imperfect information one and therefore 
uncertainty is not ruled out. We also keep the same ranking of strategies and payoffs as in the normal form. 
Figure 1 depicts the Extended Form of the Battle of the Sexes with associated payoffs of each outcome. The 
dashed line indicates the Emirates’ uncertainty in the game. 
Figure 1: Extensive form Battle of the Sexes Payoff Tree 
 
Since there are three choices at each decision node, then are 3 × 3× 3 = 27 possible strategy profiles 
representing a complete contingency plan for the Emirates. Hence, one possible complete and contingency plan 
for the Emirates may consist of nine strategy profiles. These are (s 4,s4,s4), (s4,s4,s5), (s4,s5,s6), (s6,s6,s6) (s6,s6,s4), 
Abu Dhabi
Emirates 3,2
0,0
0,3
Emirates
0, 0
0,0
0,0
Emirates
2, 3
0,0
0,0
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(s6,s4,s5), (s5,s5,s5), (s5,s5,s4), (s5,s6,s6,).There are three nodes for Abu Dhabi with one choice for each; i.e. 1 × 1 × 1= 
1. Hence, the complete contingent plan of Abu Dhabi consists  of strategy profiles (s1,s2,s3). The corresponding 
strategic form of the extensive game is shown in table 3 (A and E refer respectively to Abu Dhabi and the 
Emirates).  
Table 3 The Corresponding Strategic Form of the Extensive Form  
E 
 SP+ s4,s4,s4 s4,s4,s5 s4,s5,s6 s6,s6,s6 s6,s6,s4 s6,,s5,s4,, s5,s5,s5 s5,s5,s4, s5,s4,s6  
A s1 *3,2 3*,2 3,2  0*,3* 0*,3* 0*,3* 0,0    0,0 0,0 
 s2 0,0  0,0 2,3* 00 00 *2,3* 2*,3* 2*,3* 0,0, 
 s3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 00 0,0 0,0 0,0 
SP+ =Strategy profiles 
Unlike the normal form in table 2, in table 3, there are six PNSEs in the corresponding strateg ic form of the 
extensive form. It is noticeable that the strategy profile (s1, s4), which is a Nash Equilibrium in the strategic game, 
is the no longer Nash Equilibrium in the ordinal form of the extensive form as shown  in table 3. This would be 
explained by the process of backward induction. Performing backward induction in the tree of figure 1, it is 
obvious that the Emirates strategy s6 represent a credible threat against Abu Dhabi strategy s1 which proved to 
be an incredible threat. It also represents a punishment and an example of negative reciprocity that provides 
the Emirates the opportunity to preserve their local autonomy.  
With backward induction when the Emirates chose its optimal choice s6 in its upper subgame, Abu Dhabi 
encountered at its top decision node the strategies (s1,s6) with payoffs 0,3 and the strategies (s2, s5) with payoffs 
2, 3. Rationally, Abu Dhabi would choose the strategy s2, with payoff 2 rather than s1 with a payoff of zero. Thus, 
the strategy profile (s2, s5) is the outcome of the game and the only surviving Nash equilibrium from the six Nash 
equilibria in the corresponding strategic form of the extensive form (i.e. the six Nash equilibria in the strategic 
form represent a proper superset of the outcome s2, s5).  
Thus, the resulting subgame perfect (SPE) is < s2 (s5, s6) > (i.e. < (FA), (FE, SE,) >.  This SPE and the outcome of the 
game have led to the preferred choice of the Emirates and the second choice of Abu Dhabi: i.e. a loose federation 
with a weak federal government and strongly autonomous local Emirates governments. In fact, the regional 
international political context at the time of the game helps us to explain the outcome of this game. Both Abu 
Dhabi and the Emirates encountered an outside threat from Iran and other neighboring countries which claimed 
the ownership of the whole area of the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar.  
This threat operated to encourage the policymakers to coordinate their actions and chose their pure strategies 
instead of their mixed strategies. In fact, the idea of randomizing the choices of their strategies was not even 
part of the mindset of the policymakers. By establishing the Federation of the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh 
Zayed laid the foundation of the Emirati economic miracle which transformed the country from a poor country 
to one which enjoys one of the highest living standards in the world. To see how the outcome of the game have 
materialized in practice we need to examine the resultant arrangements and actual operation of the UAE federal 
political system. 
The federal Constitution has provided for two formal layers of government: a loose federal government and 
strong local autonomous Emirate government. Therefore, the informal patron-client network (the Majlis), as 
explained in a previous section, continues to operate under the new system. The Constitution, under Articles  
120 and 121, limited the federal government jurisdiction to issues of foreign affairs, security and defense, 
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nationality and immigration , education, public health, currency, postal,  telephone and other services such as 
communications, air traffic control and licensing of aircraft, in addition to a number of other functions specifically 
prescribed, including labor relations, banking, delimitation of territorial waters and extradition of criminals  
(Government, 1971). In practice, the relatively powerful Emirates governments such as Dubai, and to some extent 
Sharjah, have enjoyed a relatively stronger say even in some of these federal government jurisdictions. For 
example, Dubai has its own army and police force as well as substantial influence over its educational policy.  
 The constitution also gives the Emirates local governments full control over their local affairs and economic 
resources and thereby making, at least theoretically, the federal government wholly dependent on the Emirates 
financial contributions to the federal budget in addition to its self-generated revenues. In practice, only the 
super-rich Emirates, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai make annual financial contributions to the federal budget. Whereas 
the oil-rich Abu Dhabi government alone contributes approximately 85% of the federal revenues, the Dubai 
government contributes about 15%. (Elhussein, 1990, p. 285).  
This fact alone provides Abu Dhabi with a dominant status in the federal government institutions which provides 
the three poor Emirates with most social services such as public education, health, social welfare and policing 
services. This situation reflects itself in the distribution of decision-making powers in the federal government as 
revealed by the distribution of powers in its policymaking institutions. Although Abu Dhabi has the upper hand 
in the federal government because it contributes around 85% of its budgets, the Emirates preserved their local 
autonomy with autonomous Emirates local governments.  
The constitution provides for the establishment of five federal structures: The Higher Council of the Emirate 
Rulers (HCOER), the Presidency, the Federal Council of Ministers (FCOM), the Federal National Council (FNC), 
and the Federal Court (FC). The HCOER is formed from the rulers of the seven Emirates. Formally, the Constitution 
bestows all legislative and executive power on the HCOER. All other institutions functions and powers are 
delegated by the HCOER. According to the Constitution, the HCOER should select a chair and a vice-chair from 
its members by rotation.  
However, by convention, the Chair is always the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Vice-Chair is the ruler of Dubai. 
Again, by convention the chair of HCOER is ex officio the President and the Vice-Chair the Vice President. By 
convention the ruler of Abu Dhabi is also the president and Dubai ruler is the vice president. The latter is the 
Prime Minister of the federal government. Formally, Decision-making in the council is based on majority voting 
in procedural matters but it gives both Abu Dhabi and Dubai veto powers in substantive matters. Since the HCER 
does not meet frequently, it delegates all its power to the President thereby bestowing legisla tive and executive 
powers on him. 
Membership in the FCOM is distributed among the Emirates according to a certain quota which assigns 
important ministries to Abu Dhabi and Dubai thereby reflecting their weights in the federal system. For example, 
Whereas Abu Dhabi usually occupies the offices of foreign affairs, the interior, and defense, Dubai usually 
occupies the offices of finance and economy. The FNC, which has only non-obligatory advisory powers, consists 
of forty members, with 8 representatives for both Abu Dhabi and Dubai, 6 representatives the Emirate of Sharjah 
and Ras Al-Khaimah, 4 for representatives for each of the Emirates of Ajman, Um Al-Quwain, and Fujairah. These 
quotas in the FNC reflect the weight of the Emirates in term of status and population size. Previously the 
representatives of each Emirate in the FNC were appointed by the concerned Emirate ruler thereby reflecting 
the centricity of the ruler in the patron-client network. However, since 2006 half of the FNC members in each 
Emirate are elected by an electoral college whose members are chosen by the Emirates ruler. In fact, the Emirate 
ruler also selects members to occupy different offices in the federal government and thereby allowing him to 
generate his clients’ loyalty to him and to enhance legitimacy in his Emirates. 
Conclusion 
In summary, the major objective of this article is to study the establishment of the state of the United Arab 
Emirates using game theory as an approach. Specifically, the article utilizes  an extended version of the classical 
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“Battle of the Sexes” game to model the main question addressed by this article. The main question addressed 
in the articles is to what extent that the successful formation of the Federation of the United Arab from the 
previous Trucial Emirates is explainable by the logic of game theory?  
The intention is to use the establishment of the state of the United Arab Emirates as a case in a quasi -
experimental setting. There are two policymakers: the ruler of Abu Dhabi Emirate on the one hand and the rulers 
of the other six Emirates combined. The use of the “Battle of the Sexes” game is appropriate here because there 
were two policymakers or policymakers in this policymaking situation who shared a common goal, namely to 
establish a new state from the several independently autonomous tribal entities which existed for centuries in 
the area but they had different views and arrangements about this unifying entity.  
Whereas Abu Dhabi wanted a strong federal system with a strong federal government, the Emirates was keen 
to preserve their autonomy wanted a weak federal government and strong and autonomous local Emirates 
government. The fact that the other six Emirates shared the same goal is the justification for treating them as 
one policymaker in the game. The primary motivation for these tribal entities to come together to form a new 
state is Iran and other neighboring countries’ declared claim of owning the territory in which these tribes lived 
for a long time. Finally, the paper recommends that researchers in political science and public policy try to apply 
game theory to political science and public policy issues to enrich literature in these two fields. 
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